Sysmon & Alerts

The Sysmon must be configured correctly for the alerts to work. The configuration of Sysmon to log the events is costly in storage and computation, so copy and use the following Sysmon Configuration tested in a controlled test environment with minimal log flooding. Any feedback on the event flooding will be acknowledged by the Security Research team.

1

Install Sysmon

Download Sysmon from the Sysinternals website:

2

Copy configuration

Copy the Sysmon Configuration file to the Sysmon folder.

3

Install with the configuration

Run the following command in an elevated command prompt:

Install Sysmon

.\sysmon64.exe -i config_file.xml

4

Verify configuration

Run the following command to verify the configuration:

Verify Sysmon configuration

.\sysmon64.exe -c

If you want to deploy Sysmon to multiple endpoints via GPO, refer to Deploying Sysmon through Group Policy (GPO)

The Sysmon Configuration file for Windows is provided below. This configuration was tested in a controlled test environment by the SA team of LogPoint and must be tested by your admins before deploying to production.

sysmon configuration (XML)

<!--
**** Please read the following before using this configuration. ****

Forked from SwiftOnSecurity's Sysmon Config and bolted together with BlueTeamLabs's and Neo23x0's Sysmon Config.
SwiftOnSecurity's Sysmon Config | A Sysmon configuration focused on default high-quality event tracing and easy customization by the community.
Source projects:    https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config | https://github.com/BlueTeamLabs/sentinel-attack/blob/master/sysmonconfig.xml | https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-export.xml
Source license:    Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 | You may privatize, fork, edit, teach, publish, or deploy for commercial use - with attribution in the text.
REQUIRED: Sysmon version 13 or higher (due to changes in syntax and bug-fixes)
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
NOTE: To collect Sysmon logs centrally for free, see https://aka.ms/WEF | Command to allow log access to the Network Service:
wevtutil.exe sl Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational /ca:O:BAG:SYD:(A;;0xf0005;;;SY)(A;;0x5;;;BA)(A;;0x1;;;S-1-5-32-573)(A;;0x1;;;NS)
NOTE: Do not let the size and complexity of this configuration discourage you from customizing it or building your own.
This configuration is based around known, high-signal event tracing, and thus appears complicated, but it is only very
detailed. Significant effort over years has been invested in front-loading as much filtering as possible onto the
client. This is to make analysis of intrusions possible by hand, and to try to surface anomalous activity as quickly
as possible to technicians armed only with Event Viewer. Its purpose is to democratize system monitoring for all organizations.
NOTE: Sysmon is NOT a whitelist solution or HIDS correlation engine, it is a computer change logging tool.
Do NOT ignore everything possible. Sysmon's purpose is providing context during a threat or problem investigation. Legitimate
processes are routinely used by threats - do not blindly exclude them. Additionally, be mindful of process-hollowing / imitation.
NOTE: By default this monitors DNS, which is extremely noisy. If you are starting out on your monitoring journey, just remove that section.
You can remove DNS events from Event Viewer screen by applying a 'Filter Current View' for event IDs of: -22
Additionally, if you want to monitor DNS, you should deploy client-side adblocking to reduce lookups. See the DNS section for info.
NOTE: This configuration is designed for PER-MACHINE installs of Chrome and OneDrive. That moves their binaries out of user-controlled folders.
Otherwise, attackers could imitate these common applications, and bypass your logging. Below are silent upgrades you can do, no user impact:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/onedrive/per-machine-installation
- https://cloud.google.com/chrome-enterprise/browser/download/
- As of 2021-02-16 there is no machine-level version of Microsoft Teams. The one provided copies itself to the user profile.
NOTE: Sysmon is not hardened against an attacker with admin rights. Additionally, this configuration offers an attacker, willing
to study it, limited ways to evade some of the logging. If you are in a very high-threat environment, you should consider a broader,
log-most approach. However, in the vast majority of cases, an attacker will bumble through multiple behavioral traps which
this configuration monitors, especially in the first minutes.
NOTE: If you encounter unexplainable event inclusion/exclusion, you may have a second Sysmon instance installed under a different exe filename.
To clear this, try downloading the latest version and uninstalling with -u force. If it hangs, kill the processes and run it again to cleanup.
TECHNICAL:
- Run sysmon.exe -? for a briefing on Sysmon configuration.
- Sysmon XML cannot use the AMPERSAND sign. Replace it with this: &amp;
- Sysmon 8+ can track which rule caused an event to be logged through the "RuleName" field.
- If you only specify exclude for a filtering subsection, everything in that subsection is logged by default.
- Some Sysmon monitoring abilities are not meant for widely deployed general-purpose use due to performance impact. Depends on environment.
- Duplicate or overlapping "Include" rules do not result in duplicate events being logged.
- All characters enclosed by XML tags are always interpreted literally. Sysmon does not support wildcards (*), alternate characters, or RegEx.
- In registry events, the value name is appended to the full key path with a "\" delimiter. Default key values are named "\(Default)"
- "Image" is a technical term for a compiled binary file like an EXE or DLL. Also, it can match just the filename, or entire path.
- "ProcessGuid" and "LoginGuid" are not random, they contain some embedded information. https://gist.github.com/mattifestation/0102042160c9a60b2b847378c0ef70b4
FILTERING: Filter conditions available for use are: is,is not,contains,contains any,contains all,excludes,excludes any,excludes all,begin with,end with,less than,more than,image
- The "image" filter is usable on any field. Same as "is" but can either match entire string, or only the text after last "\". Credit: @mattifestation
WARNING:
- This configuration was tested in a controlled test environment by SA team of LogPoint and thus must be tested by your admins before deploying on your production environment.
- Event IDs 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 are not enabled as they require tuning specific to the environment.
Currently used Sysmon Version: v14.6
Modified on: 2023/04/24
Config version: 0.7
-->
<!-- Schema version depends on the Sysmon version -->
<Sysmon schemaversion="4.82">
<!--SYSMON META CONFIG-->
<HashAlgorithms>md5,sha1,sha256,IMPHASH</HashAlgorithms> <!-- All hash algorithms activated. --> <!-- Remove IMPHASH if you do not use DLL import fingerprinting. -->
<CheckRevocation/> <!-- Check loaded drivers, log if their code-signing certificate has been revoked, in case malware stole one to sign a kernel driver -->
<CaptureClipboard/>
<!-- <ImageLoad/> --> <!-- Would manually force-on ImageLoad monitoring, even without configuration below. Included only documentation. -->
<!-- <ProcessAccessConfig/> --> <!-- Would manually force-on ProcessAccess monitoring, even without configuration below. Included only documentation. -->
<!-- <PipeMonitoringConfig/> --> <!-- Would manually force-on PipeCreated / PipeConnected events, even without configuration below. Included only documentation. -->
<!-- <ArchiveDirectory> -->
<EventFiltering>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 1 : PROCESS CREATION [ProcessCreate]-->
<!--COMMENT:    All processes launched will be logged, except for what matches a rule below. It's best to be as specific as possible,
to avoid user-mode executables imitating other process names to avoid logging, or if malware drops files in an existing directory.
Ultimately, you must weigh CPU time checking many detailed rules, against the risk of malware exploiting the blindness created.
Beware of Masquerading, where attackers imitate the names and paths of legitimate tools. Ideally, you'd use both file path and
code signatures to validate, but Sysmon does not support that. Look into AppLocker/WindowsDeviceGuard for whitelisting support. -->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessID, Image, FileVersion, Description, Product, Company, CommandLine, CurrentDirectory, User, LogonGuid, LogonId, TerminalSessionId, IntegrityLevel, Hashes, ParentProcessGuid, ParentProcessId, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, RuleName-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<ProcessCreate onmatch="exclude">
<CommandLine condition="contains">\Machine\Scripts\Startup\ipamprovisioning.ps1</CommandLine> <!-- Windows IP Address Management (IPAM) -->
<!--SECTION: Microsoft Windows-->
<Image condition="end with">\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\20.201.1005.0009\FileCOAuth.exe</Image> <!-- Windows OneDrive-->
<CommandLine condition="is">"C:\Windows\system32\cscript.exe" /nologo "MonitorKnowledgeDiscovery.vbs"</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="begin with"> "C:\Windows\system32\wermgr.exe" "-queuereporting_svc" </CommandLine> <!--Windows:Windows error reporting/telemetry-->
<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid</CommandLine> <!--Windows-->
<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -Embedding</CommandLine> <!--Windows: WMI provider host-->
<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding</CommandLine> <!--Windows: WMI provider host-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wermgr.exe -upload</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Windows error reporting/telemetry-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\SearchIndexer.exe /Embedding</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Search Indexer-->
<CommandLine condition="is">\??\C:\Windows\system32\autochk.exe *</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Bootup: Auto Check Utility-->
<CommandLine condition="is">\SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Bootup: Windows Session Manager-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Apps permissions [ https://fossbytes.com/runtime-broker-process-windows-10/ ] -->
<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\TabTip32.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Touch Keyboard and Handwriting Panel Helper-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\TokenBrokerCookies.exe</Image> <!--Windows: SSO sign-in assistant for MicrosoftOnline.com-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\plasrv.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Performance Logs and Alerts DCOM Server-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\wifitask.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Wireless Background Task-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\CompatTelRunner.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Customer Experience Improvement-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\PrintIsolationHost.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Printing-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.Exe</Image> <!--Windows: KMS activation-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\audiodg.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Launched constantly-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Command line interface host process-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\mobsync.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Network file syncing-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\musNotification.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Update pop-ups-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\musNotificationUx.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Update pop-ups-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:Power configuration management-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\sndVol.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Volume control-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\sppsvc.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Software Protection Service-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WmiApSrv.exe</Image> <!--Windows: WMI performance adapter host process-->
<IntegrityLevel condition="is">AppContainer</IntegrityLevel> <!--Windows: Don't care about sandboxed processes right now. Will need to revisit this decision.-->
<ParentCommandLine condition="begin with">%%SystemRoot%%\system32\csrss.exe ObjectDirectory=\Windows</ParentCommandLine> <!--Windows:CommandShell: Triggered when programs use the command shell, but doesn't provide attribution for what caused it-->
<ParentCommandLine condition="is">C:\windows\system32\wermgr.exe -queuereporting</ParentCommandLine> <!--Windows:Windows error reporting/telemetry-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\WINDOWS\system32\devicecensus.exe UserCxt</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\usocoreworker.exe -Embedding</CommandLine>
<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\SearchIndexer.exe</ParentImage> <!--Windows:Search: Launches many uninteresting sub-processes-->
<!--SECTION: Windows:svchost-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k wsappx -p</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -s StateRepository</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s camsvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel</CommandLine> <!--Windows 10-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s tiledatamodelsvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k camera -s FrameServer</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s LSM</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s PlugPlay</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k defragsvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows defragmentation-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k devicesflow -s DevicesFlowUserSvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k imgsvc</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:The Windows Image Acquisition Service-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localService -s EventSystem</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localService -s bthserv</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s BthAvctpSvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localService -s nsi</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localService -s w32Time</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -s ScDeviceEnum</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation -p</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -s Dhcp</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -s EventLog</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -s TimeBrokerSvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -s WFDSConMgrSvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s BTAGService</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService</CommandLine> <!--Win10:1903:Network Connection Broker-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation -s SensrSvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV</CommandLine> <!--Windows:SSDP [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Service_Discovery_Protocol ] -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNoNetwork</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s WPDBusEnum</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s fhsvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s DeviceAssociationService</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s NcbService</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s SensorService</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s TabletInputService</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s UmRdpService</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s WPDBusEnum</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcSvc</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Passport-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Passport Container-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation -s SCardSvr</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SessionEnv</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Remote desktop configuration-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s WdiSystemHost</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Diagnostic System Host [ http://www.blackviper.com/windows-services/diagnostic-system-host/ ] -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s WdiSystemHost</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Diagnostic System Host [ http://www.blackviper.com/windows-services/diagnostic-system-host/ ] -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted</CommandLine> <!--Windows-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Windows Live Sign-In Assistant [ https://www.howtogeek.com/howto/30348/what-are-wlidsvc.exe-and-wlidsvcm.exe-and-why-are-they-running/ ] -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ncaSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network Connectivity Assistant [ http://www.blackviper.com/windows-services/network-connectivity-assistant/ ] -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BDESVC</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: BitLocker Drive Encryption-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BDESVC</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Win10:1903:Network: BitLocker Drive Encryption-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BITS</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Background Intelligent File Transfer (BITS) -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Background Intelligent File Transfer (BITS) -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s CertPropSvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s DsmSvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Gpsvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Group Policy -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s ProfSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s SENS</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s SessionEnv</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Themes</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Winmgmt</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -p -s DoSvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -p</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -s Dnscache</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: DNS caching, other uses -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -s LanmanWorkstation</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: "Workstation" service, used for SMB file-sharing connections and RDP-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -s NlaSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Network Location Awareness-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -s TermService</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Terminal Services (RDP)-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -p</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkServiceNetworkRestricted</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k rPCSS</CommandLine> <!--Windows Services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k secsvcs</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k swprv</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Software Shadow Copy Provider-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k unistackSvcGroup</CommandLine> <!--Windows 10-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k utcsvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows Services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k wbioSvcGroup</CommandLine> <!--Windows Services-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe</Image>
</ProcessCreate>
</RuleGroup>

<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 2 : FILE CREATION TIME RETROACTIVELY CHANGED IN THE FILESYSTEM [FileCreateTime]-->
<!--COMMENT:    [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1099 ] -->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, TargetFilename, CreationUtcTime, PreviousCreationUtcTime-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<FileCreateTime onmatch="include">
<Image name="T1099" condition="begin with">C:\Users</Image> <!--Look for timestomping in user area, usually nothing should be doing that here-->
<TargetFilename name="T1099" condition="end with">.exe</TargetFilename> <!--Look for backdated executables anywhere-->
<Image condition="image">OneDrive.exe</Image> <!--OneDrive constantly changes file times-->
<Image name="T1099" condition="begin with">\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy</Image> <!--Nothing should be written here | Credit: @SBousseaden [ https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1133030955407630336 ] -->
<Image name="technique_id=T1099,technique_name=Timestomp,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="begin with">C:\Temp</Image>
<Image name="technique_id=T1099,technique_name=Timestomp,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Temp</Image>
<Image name="technique_id=T1099,technique_name=Timestomp,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="begin with">C:\Tmp</Image>
</FileCreateTime>
</RuleGroup>
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<FileCreateTime onmatch="exclude">
<Image condition="image">OneDrive.exe</Image> <!--OneDrive constantly changes file times-->
<Image condition="image">C:\Windows\system32\backgroundTaskHost.exe</Image>
<Image condition="end with">AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe</Image>
<Image condition="end with">Root\VFS\ProgramFilesX86\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe</Image>
<Image condition="contains">setup</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
<Image condition="contains">install</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
<Image condition="contains">Update\</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
<Image condition="end with">\redist.exe</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
<Image condition="is">msiexec.exe</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
<Image condition="is">TrustedInstaller.exe</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
<TargetFilename condition="contains">\NVIDIA\NvBackend\ApplicationOntology\</TargetFilename> <!--NVIDIA GeForce Experience Application Ontology, 1000's of events in user profile-->
</FileCreateTime>
</RuleGroup>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 3 : NETWORK CONNECTION INITIATED [NetworkConnect]-->
<!--COMMENT:    By default this configuration takes a very conservative approach to network logging, limited to only extremely high-signal events.-->
<!--COMMENT:    [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Exfiltration ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Lateral_Movement ] -->
<!--TECHNICAL:    For the DestinationHostname, Sysmon uses the GetNameInfo API, which will often not have any information, and may just be a CDN. This is NOT reliable for filtering.-->
<!--TECHNICAL:    For the DestinationPortName, Sysmon uses the GetNameInfo API for the friendly name of ports you see in logs.-->
<!--TECHNICAL:    These exe do not initiate their connections, and thus includes do not work in this section: BITSADMIN NLTEST-->

<!-- https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/APT-Log-Analysis-Tracking-Attack-Tools-by-Audit-Policy-and-Sysmon.pdf -->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, User, Protocol, Initiated, SourceIsIpv6, SourceIp, SourceHostname, SourcePort, SourcePortName, DestinationIsIpV6, DestinationIp, DestinationHostname, DestinationPort, DestinationPortName-->

<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<NetworkConnect onmatch="include">
<!--Suspicious sources for network-connecting binaries-->
<Image name="Usermode" condition="begin with">C:\Users</Image> <!--Tools downloaded by users can use other processes for networking, but this is a very valuable indicator.-->
<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\Recycle</Image> <!--Nothing should operate from the RecycleBin locations.-->
<Image condition="begin with">C:\ProgramData</Image> <!--Normally, network communications should be sourced from "Program Files" not from ProgramData, something to look at-->
<Image condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Temp</Image> <!--Suspicious anything would communicate from the system-level temp directory-->
<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">\</Image> <!--Devices and VSC shouldn't be executing changes | Credit: @SBousseaden @ionstorm @neu5ron @PerchedSystems [ https://twitter.com/SwiftOnSecurity/status/1133167323991486464 ] -->
<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\perflogs</Image> <!-- Credit @blu3_team [ https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/05/netconn-from-suspicious-directories.html ] -->
<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\intel</Image> <!-- Credit @blu3_team [ https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/05/netconn-from-suspicious-directories.html ] -->
<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\fonts</Image> <!-- Credit @blu3_team [ https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/05/netconn-from-suspicious-directories.html ] -->
<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\config</Image> <!-- Credit @blu3_team [ https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/05/netconn-from-suspicious-directories.html ] -->
<!--Suspicious Windows tools-->
<Image condition="image">at.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remote task scheduling, removed in Win10 | Credit @ion-storm -->
<Image condition="image">certutil.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Certificate tool can contact outbound | Credit @ion-storm @FVT [ https://twitter.com/FVT/status/834433734602530817 ] -->
<Image condition="image">cmd.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remote command prompt-->
<Image condition="image">cmstp.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Connection manager profiles can launch executables from WebDAV [ https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408 ] | Credit @NickTyrer @Oddvarmoe @KyleHanslovan @subTee -->
<Image condition="image">cscript.exe</Image> <!--WindowsScriptingHost: | Credit @Cyb3rOps [ https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/a4b4af9481e01e749409 ] -->
<Image condition="image">driverquery.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remote recognisance of system configuration, oudated/vulnerable drivers -->
<Image condition="image">dsquery.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft: Query Active Directory -->
<Image condition="image">hh.exe</Image> <!--Windows: HTML Help Executable, opens CHM files -->
<Image condition="image">infDefaultInstall.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft: [ https://github.com/huntresslabs/evading-autoruns ] | Credit @KyleHanslovan -->
<Image condition="image">java.exe</Image> <!--Java: Monitor usage of vulnerable application and init from JAR files | Credit @ion-storm -->
<Image condition="image">javaw.exe</Image> <!--Java: Monitor usage of vulnerable application and init from JAR files -->
<Image condition="image">javaws.exe</Image> <!--Java: Monitor usage of vulnerable application and init from JAR files -->
<Image condition="image">mmc.exe</Image> <!--Windows: -->
<Image condition="image">msbuild.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/a314f6106633fba4b70f9d6ddbee452e8f8f44a72117749c21243dc93c7ed3ac?environmentId=100 ] -->
<Image condition="image">mshta.exe</Image> <!--Windows: HTML application executes scripts without IE protections | Credit @ion-storm [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application ] -->
<Image condition="image">msiexec.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Can install from http:// paths | Credit @vector-sec -->
<Image condition="image">nbtstat.exe</Image> <!--Windows: NetBIOS statistics, attackers use to enumerate local network -->
<Image condition="image">net.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Note - May not detect anything, net.exe is a front-end to lower APIs | Credit @ion-storm -->
<Image condition="image">net1.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Launched by "net.exe", but it may not detect connections either -->
<Image condition="image">notepad.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://secrary.com/ReversingMalware/CoinMiner/ ] [ https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2013/08/08/why-is-notepad-exe-connecting-to-the-internet/ ] -->
<Image condition="image">nslookup.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Retrieve data over DNS -->
<Image condition="image">powershell.exe</Image> <!--Windows: PowerShell interface-->
<Image condition="image">powershell_ise.exe</Image> <!--Windows: PowerShell interface-->
<Image condition="image">pwsh.exe</Image> <!--Windows: PowerShell interface-->
<Image condition="image">qprocess.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/APT-Log-Analysis-Tracking-Attack-Tools-by-Audit-Policy-and-Sysmon.pdf ] -->
<Image condition="image">qwinsta.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remotely query login sessions on a server or workstation | Credit @ion-storm -->
<Image condition="image">reg.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remote Registry editing ability | Credit @ion-storm -->
<Image condition="image">regsvcs.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/3f94d7080e6c5b8f59eeecc3d44f7e817b31562caeba21d02ad705a0bfc63d67?environmentId=100 ] -->
<Image condition="image">regsvr32.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2016/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html ] -->
<Image condition="image">rundll32.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2016/07/22/why-is-rundll32-exe-connecting-to-the-internet/ ] -->
<Image condition="image">rwinsta.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Disconnect remote sessions | Credit @ion-storm -->
<Image condition="image">sc.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remotely change Windows service settings | Credit @ion-storm -->
<Image condition="image">schtasks.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Command-line interface to local and remote tasks -->
<Image condition="image">taskkill.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Kill processes, has remote ability -->
<Image condition="image">tasklist.exe</Image> <!--Windows: List processes, has remote ability -->
<Image condition="image">wmic.exe</Image> <!--WindowsManagementInstrumentation: Credit @Cyb3rOps [ https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/a4b4af9481e01e749409 ] -->
<Image condition="image">wscript.exe</Image> <!--WindowsScriptingHost: | Credit @arekfurt -->
<!--Live of the Land Binaries and scripts (LOLBAS) -->
<Image condition="image">bitsadmin.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Background Intelligent Transfer Service - Can download from URLs -->
<Image condition="image">esentutl.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Database utilities for the ESE - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
<Image condition="image">expand.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Expands one or more compressed files - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
<Image condition="image">extrac32.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Uncompress .cab files - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
<Image condition="image">findstr.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Search for strings - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
<Image condition="image">GfxDownloadWrapper.exe</Image> <!-- Intel Graphics Control Panel: Remote file download -->
<Image condition="image">ieexec.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Microsoft .NET Framework application - Download and execute from URLs -->
<Image condition="image">makecab.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Packages existing files into a .cab - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
<Image condition="image">replace.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Used to replace file with another file - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
<Image condition="image">Excel.exe</Image> <!-- Windows Office: Excel - Can download from URLs -->
<Image condition="image">Powerpnt.exe</Image> <!-- Windows Office: PowerPoint - Can download from URLs -->
<Image condition="image">Winword.exe</Image> <!-- Windows Office: Word - Can download from URLs -->
<Image condition="image">squirrel.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Update the Nuget/Squirrel packages. Part of Teams. - Can download from URLs -->
<!--Relevant 3rd Party Tools-->
<Image condition="image">netcat.exe</Image> <!-- Compiled netcat.c file if naming convention is kept https://github.com/DarrenRainey/netcat -->
<Image condition="image">nc.exe</Image> <!-- Nmap's modern version of netcat [ https://nmap.org/ncat/guide/index.html#ncat-overview ] [ https://securityblog.gr/1517/create-backdoor-in-windows-with-ncat/ ] -->
<Image condition="image">nc64.exe</Image> <!-- 64-bit version of nc that can be used on 64-bit Windows Architectures https://github.com/DarrenRainey/netcat-->
<Image condition="image">ncat.exe</Image> <!-- Nmap's modern version of netcat [ https://nmap.org/ncat/guide/index.html#ncat-overview ] [ https://securityblog.gr/1517/create-backdoor-in-windows-with-ncat/ ] -->
<Image condition="image">procdump.exe</Image> <!-- Sysinternals Suite client side that can be used to dump clear text passwords from memory -->
<Image condition="image">procdump64.exe</Image> <!-- Sysinternals Suite client side 64-bit version that can be used to dump clear text passwords from memory -->
<Image condition="image">psexec.exe</Image> <!--Sysinternals:PsExec client side | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
<Image condition="image">psexec64.exe</Image> <!-- Sysinernals:PsExec64 client side | 64-bit version of psexec.exe -->
<Image condition="image">psexesvc.exe</Image> <!--Sysinternals:PsExec server side | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
<Image condition="image">tor.exe</Image> <!--Tor [ https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/800bf028a23440134fc834efc5c1e02cc70f05b2e800bbc285d7c92a4b126b1c?environmentId=100 ] -->
<Image condition="image">vnc.exe</Image> <!-- VNC client | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
<Image condition="image">vncservice.exe</Image> <!-- VNC server | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
<Image condition="image">vncviewer.exe</Image> <!-- VNC client | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
<Image condition="image">winexesvc.exe</Image> <!-- Winexe service executable | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
<Image condition="image">nmap.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">psinfo.exe</Image>
<!--Ports: Suspicious-->
<DestinationPort name="SSH" condition="is">22</DestinationPort> <!--SSH protocol, monitor admin connections-->
<DestinationPort name="Telnet" condition="is">23</DestinationPort> <!--Telnet protocol, monitor admin connections, insecure-->
<DestinationPort name="SMTP" condition="is">25</DestinationPort> <!--SMTP mail protocol port, insecure, used by threats-->
<DestinationPort name="IMAP" condition="is">143</DestinationPort> <!--IMAP mail protocol port, insecure, used by threats-->
<DestinationPort name="RDP" condition="is">3389</DestinationPort> <!--Windows:RDP: Monitor admin connections-->
<SourcePort name="RDP Tunnel" condition="is">3389</SourcePort> <!--RDP protocol tunnel | detects tunneling of RDP by ngrok and other utilities-->
<DestinationPort name="VNC" condition="is">5800</DestinationPort> <!--VNC protocol: Monitor admin connections, often insecure, using hard-coded admin password-->
<DestinationPort name="VNC" condition="is">5900</DestinationPort> <!--VNC protocol Monitor admin connections, often insecure, using hard-coded admin password-->
<DestinationPort name="WinRM" condition="is">5985</DestinationPort> <!-- WinRM protocol used for remote connections to execute commands -->
<DestinationPort name="WinRM over HTTPS" condition="is">5986</DestinationPort> <!-- WinRM over HTTPS when set up in an environment can be used for remote connections to execute commands -->
<DestinationPort name="Alert,Metasploit" condition="is">4444</DestinationPort> <!-- Default Metasploit port -->
<!--Ports: Proxy-->
<DestinationPort name="Proxy" condition="is">1080</DestinationPort> <!--Socks proxy port | Credit @ion-storm-->
<DestinationPort name="Proxy" condition="is">3128</DestinationPort> <!--Socks proxy port | Credit @ion-storm-->
<DestinationPort name="Proxy" condition="is">8080</DestinationPort> <!--Socks proxy port | Credit @ion-storm-->
<!--Ports: Tor-->
<DestinationPort name="Tor" condition="is">1723</DestinationPort> <!--Tor protocol [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090 ] | Credit @ion-storm-->
<DestinationPort name="Tor" condition="is">9001</DestinationPort> <!--Tor protocol [ http://www.computerworlduk.com/tutorial/security/tor-enterprise-2016-blocking-malware-darknet-use-rogue-nodes-3633907/ ] -->
<DestinationPort name="Tor" condition="is">9030</DestinationPort> <!--Tor protocol [ http://www.computerworlduk.com/tutorial/security/tor-enterprise-2016-blocking-malware-darknet-use-rogue-nodes-3633907/ ] -->
<DestinationPort name="Tor" condition="is">9150</DestinationPort>
<DestinationPort name="Meterpreter" condition="is">4444</DestinationPort> <!-- Default Metasploit port -->
<DestinationPort name="FTP" condition="is">21</DestinationPort>
<!--Live of the Land Binaries and scripts (LOLBAS) -->
<Image condition="image">bitsadmin.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Background Intelligent Transfer Service - Can download from URLs -->
<Image condition="image">esentutl.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Database utilities for the ESE - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
<Image condition="image">expand.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Expands one or more compressed files - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
<Image condition="image">extrac32.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Uncompress .cab files - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
<Image condition="image">findstr.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Search for strings - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
<Image condition="image">GfxDownloadWrapper.exe</Image> <!-- Intel Graphics Control Panel: Remote file download -->
<Image condition="image">ieexec.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Microsoft .NET Framework application - Download and execute from URLs -->
<Image condition="image">makecab.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Packages existing files into a .cab - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
<Image condition="image">replace.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Used to replace file with another file - Can fetch from UNC paths -->
<Image condition="image">Excel.exe</Image> <!-- Windows Office: Excel - Can download from URLs -->
<Image condition="image">Powerpnt.exe</Image> <!-- Windows Office: PowerPoint - Can download from URLs -->
<Image condition="image">Winword.exe</Image> <!-- Windows Office: Word - Can download from URLs -->
<Image condition="image">squirrel.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Update the Nuget/Squirrel packages. Part of Teams. - Can download from URLs -->
<Image condition="image">omniinet.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">hpsmhd.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">ipconfig.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">netstat.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">qprocess.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">quser.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">query.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">runas.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">netsh.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">klist.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">wevtutil.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">taskeng.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">bash.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">pcalua.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">nltest.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">winrs.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">Mavinject.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">at.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">certutil.exe</Image>
<Image name="technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="begin with">C:\Temp</Image>
<Image name="technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="begin with">C:\Users\Default\</Image>
<Image name="technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="begin with">C:\Users\Public\</Image>
<Image name="technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="begin with">C:\Users\NetworkService\</Image>
<Image name="technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Debug\</Image>
<Image name="technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Media\</Image>
<Image name="technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Help\</Image>
<Image name="technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\addins\</Image>
<Image name="technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\repair\</Image>
<Image name="technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\security\</Image>
<Image name="technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\</Image>
<Image name="technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="contains">\htdocs\</Image>
<Image name="technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="contains">\wwwroot\</Image>
<Image name="technique_id=T1218,technique_name=Signed Binary Proxy Execution,phase_name=Execution" condition="image">SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe</Image>
<!-- Suspicious Domains-->
<DestinationHostname condition="end with">.githubusercontent.com</DestinationHostname>
<DestinationHostname condition="end with">.pastebin.com</DestinationHostname>
<DestinationHostname condition="end with">dl.dropboxusercontent.com</DestinationHostname>
</NetworkConnect>
</RuleGroup>
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<NetworkConnect onmatch="exclude">
<Image condition="image">SearchUI.exe</Image> <!-- Microsoft: Cortana-->
<Image condition="image">wermgr.exe</Image> <!-- Microsoft: Windows Error Reporting-->
<Image condition="image">MoUsoCoreWorker.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">backgroundTaskHost.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">SearchApp.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe</Image>
<Image condition="end with">AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft: Teams-->
<!--Microsoft: Teams-->
<DestinationHostname condition="is">microsoft.com</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update delivery-->
<DestinationHostname condition="end with">.microsoft.com</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update delivery-->
<DestinationHostname condition="end with">microsoft.com.akadns.net</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update delivery-->
<DestinationHostname condition="end with">microsoft.com.nsatc.net</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update delivery-->
<!--OCSP known addresses-->
<DestinationIp condition="is">23.4.43.27</DestinationIp> <!--Digicert [ https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/ip/23.4.43.27 ] -->
<DestinationIp condition="is">72.21.91.29</DestinationIp> <!--Digicert [ https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/ip/72.21.91.29 ] -->
<!--Section: Loopback Addresses-->
<DestinationIp condition="is">127.0.0.1</DestinationIp> <!--Credit @ITProPaul-->
<DestinationIp condition="begin with">fe80:0:0:0</DestinationIp> <!--Credit @ITProPaul-->
<!-- OneDrive -->
<Image condition="end with">\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft: OneDrive-->
<!-- SECTION: PRTG -->
<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\PRTG Network Monitor\PRTG Probe.exe</Image>
</NetworkConnect>
</RuleGroup>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 4 : RESERVED FOR SYSMON SERVICE STATUS MESSAGES-->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, State, Version, SchemaVersion-->
<!--Cannot be filtered.-->
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 5 : PROCESS ENDED [ProcessTerminate]-->
<!--COMMENT:    Useful data in building infection timelines.-->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<ProcessTerminate onmatch="include">
<Image condition="begin with">C:\Temp</Image>
<Image condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Temp</Image>
<Image condition="begin with">C:\Users</Image><!--Process terminations by user binaries-->
<Image condition="begin with">\</Image> <!--Devices and VSC shouldn't be executing changes | Credit: @SBousseaden @ionstorm @neu5ron @PerchedSystems [ https://twitter.com/SwiftOnSecurity/status/1133167323991486464 ] -->
</ProcessTerminate>
</RuleGroup>
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<ProcessTerminate onmatch="exclude">
</ProcessTerminate>
</RuleGroup>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 6 : DRIVER LOADED INTO KERNEL [DriverLoad]-->
<!--COMMENT:    Because drivers with bugs can be used to escalate to kernel permissions, be extremely selective
about what you exclude from monitoring. Low event volume, little incentive to exclude.
[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014 ] -->
<!--TECHNICAL:    Sysmon will check the signing certificate revocation status of any driver you don't exclude.-->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, ImageLoaded, Hashes, Signed, Signature, SignatureStatus-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<DriverLoad onmatch="exclude">
<!--Exclude signed Microsoft drivers-->
<Rule groupRelation="and">
<Signature condition="contains">Microsoft</Signature>
<SignatureStatus condition="is">Valid</SignatureStatus>
</Rule>
<!--Exclude signed Inter drivers-->
<Rule groupRelation="and">
<Signature condition="begin with">Intel </Signature>
<SignatureStatus condition="is">Valid</SignatureStatus>
</Rule>
<!--Exclude signed VMware drivers-->
<Rule groupRelation="and">
<Signature condition="begin with">VMware</Signature>
<SignatureStatus condition="is">Valid</SignatureStatus>
</Rule>
</DriverLoad>
</RuleGroup>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 7 : DLL (IMAGE) LOADED BY PROCESS [ImageLoad]-->
<!--COMMENT:    Can cause high system load, disabled by default.-->
<!--COMMENT:    [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1073 ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1038 ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1034 ] -->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, ImageLoaded, Hashes, Signed, Signature, SignatureStatus-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<ImageLoad onmatch="include">
<!--Detect execution of HTA using the IE Javascript engine to bypass AMSI-->
<Rule groupRelation="and">
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">jscript9.dll</ImageLoaded>
<Image condition="end with">mshta.exe</Image>
</Rule>
<ImageLoaded condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\cryptdll.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\samlib.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\WinSCard.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\hid.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\vaultcli.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="is">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\wbem\wbemdisp.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Temp\</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">scrrun.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">vbscript.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">wshom.ocx</ImageLoaded>
<!-- Microsoft: These two are untested | Might be noisy -->
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">kerberos.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">dsparse.dll</ImageLoaded>
<!--Check for loading of the PowerShell engine-->
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">System.Management.Automation.ni.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">System.Management.Automation.dll</ImageLoaded>
<!--Detect the Squiblydoo technique-->
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">scrobj.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">crypt0.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded name="technique_id=T1003,technique_name=Credential Dumping,phase_name=Credential Access" condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\wlanapi.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded name="technique_id=T1137,technique_name=Office Application Startup,phase_name=Persistence" condition="end with">.wll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded name="technique_id=T1137,technique_name=Office Application Startup,phase_name=Persistence" condition="end with">.xll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded name="technique_id=T1053,technique_name=Scheduled Task,phase_name=Execution" condition="end with">taskschd.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded name="technique_id=T1117,technique_name=Regsvr32,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="end with">scrobj.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded name="technique_id=T1073,technique_name=DLL Side-Loading,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="contains any">admin$;c$;\\;\appdata\;\temp\</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="begin with" name="technique_id=T1073,technique_name=DLL Side-Loading,phase_name=Defense Evasion">c:\programdata\</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="begin with" name="technique_id=T1073,technique_name=DLL Side-Loading,phase_name=Defense Evasion">C:\Windows\Media\</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="begin with" name="technique_id=T1073,technique_name=DLL Side-Loading,phase_name=Defense Evasion">C:\Windows\addins\</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="begin with" name="technique_id=T1073,technique_name=DLL Side-Loading,phase_name=Defense Evasion">C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="begin with" name="technique_id=T1073,technique_name=DLL Side-Loading,phase_name=Defense Evasion">C:\Windows\Debug\</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="begin with" name="technique_id=T1073,technique_name=DLL Side-Loading,phase_name=Defense Evasion">C:\Windows\Temp</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="begin with" name="technique_id=T1073,technique_name=DLL Side-Loading,phase_name=Defense Evasion">C:\PerfLogs\</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="begin with" name="technique_id=T1073,technique_name=DLL Side-Loading,phase_name=Defense Evasion">C:\Windows\Help\</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="begin with" name="technique_id=T1073,technique_name=DLL Side-Loading,phase_name=Defense Evasion">C:\Intel\Logs\</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="begin with" name="technique_id=T1073,technique_name=DLL Side-Loading,phase_name=Defense Evasion">C:\Temp</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="begin with" name="technique_id=T1073,technique_name=DLL Side-Loading,phase_name=Defense Evasion">C:\Windows\repair\</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="begin with" name="technique_id=T1073,technique_name=DLL Side-Loading,phase_name=Defense Evasion">C:\Windows\security\</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="begin with" name="technique_id=T1073,technique_name=DLL Side-Loading,phase_name=Defense Evasion">C:\Windows\Fonts\</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="begin with" name="technique_id=T1073,technique_name=DLL Side-Loading,phase_name=Defense Evasion">file:</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded name="technique_id=T1073,technique_name=DLL Side-Loading,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="contains">$Recycle.bin\</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded name="technique_id=T1073,technique_name=DLL Side-Loading,phase_name=Defense Evasion" condition="contains">\Windows\IME\</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL</ImageLoaded> <!-- The GAC (Global Assembly Cache) is a central repo for assemblies to reside, ready for the CLR (Common Language Runtime) to convert the code into the native code for the host OS to execute -->
<!-- WMI Related DLLs-->
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">wbemcons.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">wmiclnt.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">WmiApRpl.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">wmiprov.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">wmiutils.dll</ImageLoaded>
<Rule groupRelation="and">
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">wbemcomn.dll</ImageLoaded>
<Image condition="is not">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe</Image>
</Rule>
<Rule groupRelation="and">
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">wbemprox.dll</ImageLoaded> <!--https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16-->                    <SignatureStatus condition="is">Valid</SignatureStatus>
<Image condition="is not">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe</Image>
</Rule>
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">WMINet_Utils.dll</ImageLoaded>
<Rule groupRelation="and">
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">wbemsvc.dll</ImageLoaded>
<Image condition="is not">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe</Image>
</Rule>
<Rule groupRelation="and">
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">fastprox.dll</ImageLoaded>
<Image condition="is not">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe</Image>
</Rule>
<!-- Visual Basic DLLs loaded by Office Products -->
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">VBE7.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">VBEUI.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">VBE7INTL.dll</ImageLoaded>
<!-- Common Svchost DLL Search Order Hijack Dlls | Untested and might be noisy-->
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">tsmsisrv.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">tsvipsrv.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">wlbsctrl.dll</ImageLoaded>
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">clr.dll</ImageLoaded> <!-- clr.dll is the primary binary in the .NET runtime version 4.0 and forward. This dll used to be mscorwks.dll in previous versions of .NET | Loading of this DLL by say Office Products is suspicious. -->

</ImageLoad>
</RuleGroup>
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<ImageLoad onmatch="exclude">
<ImageLoaded condition="begin with">C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform</ImageLoaded>
<Image condition="end with">FileCOAuth.exe</Image>  <!-- Excluding OneDrive noise -->
<Image condition="end with">TiWorker.exe</Image> <!-- Excluding TiWorker noise -->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\sppsvc.exe</Image>  <!-- Excluding Microsoft Software Platform Protection Service -->
<Image condition="end with">WmiPrvSE.exe</Image> <!-- Very noisy-->
<Image condition="end with">WmiApSrv.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">mscorsvw.exe</Image>  <!-- Excluding Visual Studio noise -->
<Image condition="image">MoUsoCoreWorker.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">taskhostw.exe</Image>
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\backgroundTaskHost.exe</Image>
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe</Image>
<!--
<Rule groupRelation="and">
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe</Image>
<ImageLoaded condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\taskschd.dll</ImageLoaded>
</Rule>
-->
<!--Exclude svchost noise-->
<Rule groupRelation="and">
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe</Image>
<ImageLoaded condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\taskschd.dll</ImageLoaded>
</Rule>

<!--
<Rule groupRelation="and">
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\MoUsoCoreWorker.exe</Image>
<ImageLoaded condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\taskschd.dll</ImageLoaded>
</Rule>
-->
<!--
<Rule groupRelation="and">
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\mscorsvw.exe</Image>
<ImageLoaded condition="image">clr.dll</ImageLoaded>
</Rule>
-->
<!--
<Rule groupRelation="and">
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe</Image>
<ImageLoaded condition="image">taskschd.dll</ImageLoaded>
</Rule>
-->
<!--
<Rule groupRelation="and">
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe</Image>
<ImageLoaded condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\dsparse.dll</ImageLoaded>
</Rule>
-->
</ImageLoad>
</RuleGroup>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 8 : REMOTE THREAD CREATED [CreateRemoteThread]-->
<!--COMMENT:    Monitor for processes injecting code into other processes. Often used by malware to cloak their actions. Also when Firefox loads Flash.
[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1055 ] -->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, SourceProcessGuid, SourceProcessId, SourceImage, TargetProcessId, TargetImage, NewThreadId, StartAddress, StartModule, StartFunction-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<CreateRemoteThread onmatch="exclude">
<!--COMMENT: Exclude mostly-safe sources and log anything else.-->
<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe</SourceImage>
<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe</SourceImage>
<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wininit.exe</SourceImage>
<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\csrss.exe</SourceImage>
<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\services.exe</SourceImage>
<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exe</SourceImage>
<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\audiodg.exe</SourceImage>
<StartModule condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\kernel32.dll</StartModule>
<TargetImage condition="end with">Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe</TargetImage>
</CreateRemoteThread>
</RuleGroup>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 9 : RAW DISK ACCESS [RawAccessRead]-->
<!--EVENT 9: "RawAccessRead detected"-->
<!--COMMENT:    Can cause high system load, disabled by default.-->
<!--COMMENT:    Monitor for raw sector-level access to the disk, often used to bypass access control lists or access locked files.
Disabled by default since including even one entry here activates this component. Reward/performance/rule maintenance decision.
Encourage you to experiment with this feature yourself. [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1067 ] -->
<!--COMMENT:    You will likely want to set this to a full capture on domain controllers, where no process should be doing raw reads.-->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, Device-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<RawAccessRead onmatch="include">
<!--NOTE: Using "include" with no rules means nothing in this section will be logged-->
</RawAccessRead>
</RuleGroup>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 10 : INTER-PROCESS ACCESS [ProcessAccess]-->
<!--EVENT 10: "Process accessed"-->
<!--COMMENT:    Can cause high system load, disabled by default.-->
<!--COMMENT:    Monitor for processes accessing other process' memory.-->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, SourceProcessGuid, SourceProcessId, SourceThreadId, SourceImage, TargetProcessGuid, TargetProcessId, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, CallTrace-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<ProcessAccess onmatch="include">
<!-- lsass.exe access with critical permission -->
<Rule groupRelation="and">
<TargetImage condition="end with">lsass.exe</TargetImage>
<GrantedAccess condition="contains any">0x40;0x1010;0x1038;0x1410;0x1418;0x1438;0x143a;0x100000;0x1f0fff;0x1f1fff;0x1f2fff;0x1f3fff;0x1fffff</GrantedAccess> <!--0x1400 too noisy-->
</Rule>
<!--Dumping credentials from services or setting up a keylogger-->
<Rule groupRelation="and">
<TargetImage name="technique_id=T1003,technique_name=Credential Dumping" condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\csrss.exe</TargetImage> <!--Mitre T1098--> <!--Mitre T1075--> <!--Mitre T1003--><!-- depending on what you're running on your host, this might be noisy-->
<GrantedAccess>0x1F1FFF</GrantedAccess>
</Rule>
<!-- (remaining large XML content continues unchanged) -->
</EventFiltering>
</Sysmon>

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